This paper tests whether "legal bonding" is a primary cause of cross-listing premia. There are three main sets of findings. First has to do with the relationship between premia and the US stock prices. I find that premia and returns of NYSE-and NASDAQ-traded firms are strongly correlated with main US indices; however, premia and returns of OTC-and PORTAL-traded foreign firms are not correlated with US indices. Correlation only exists for firms with above-median portion of USbased trading in their total trading volume. Correlation is triggered by cross-listing; I find no significant correlation before listing. Riskier firms, firms from industries with higher global Tobin's Q, and firms from high-GDP countries and countries that have better corporate governance exhibit more correlation with US indices. The second set of findings has to do with the existence of premia in different types of firms. I find premia only in firms with above-median portions of US trading in their total trading volume; firms with below-median US trading have no premia, regardless of their listing level. The third set of findings has to do with the evolution of premia from the time of cross-listing. Premia decline significantly after listing, disappearing almost entirely after year six. The decay in premia is particularly sharp for foreign firms with below-median portion of US trading. Most of these findings cannot be explained by "legal bonding", and some of them are inconsistent with legal bonding.
Introduction
It is well known that foreign firms cross-listed in the US enjoy "cross-listing premia" -higher market valuations than non-cross-listed firms (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004) . The causes of these premia are not yet clear. Early literature attributed benefits of cross-listing to reduced market segmentation and increased liquidity, visibility, and shareholder base.
1 More recent research suggests that cross-listing is beneficial because of "bonding": by cross-listing in the US, controllers and managers of foreign firms voluntarily subject themselves to US laws and institutions, credibly promising not to exploit minority investors (Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999 and 2002) . Since stronger investor protection can increase value of minority shares, firms located in countries with poor investor protection may benefit by "borrowing" more stringent US laws through cross-listing.
The bonding theory has a growing empirical support. Firms from countries with weak investor protection regimes are more likely to cross-list in the US (Reese and Weisbach, 2002) , while firms that have a large controlling shareholder are less likely to cross-list (Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz, 2006) . Not only do cross-listed firms have higher valuations than non-cross listed firms, but cross-listed firms subject to US regulation (listed on levels 2 or 3) have higher valuations than cross-listed firms not subject to US regulation (listed on levels 1 or 4) (Doidge, Karolyi, Stulz 2004) .
Moreover, US-regulated cross-listed firms from countries with weak investor protection regimes enjoy higher premia (Doidge, However, the criticism of the bonding hypothesis has also been growing. It stemmed from the observation that cross-listed firms can misbehave without suffering notable legal consequences, which may render bonding toothless. The SEC enforcement against foreign issuers is weak, and private litigation is rare (Siegel 2005; Licht 2003) .
The fact of cross-listing doesn't seem to change firms' earnings management, at least in some poorly governed countries (Lopes, Tukamoto, and Galdi 2007) , though this result is disputed (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman).
The most recent literature concentrated on separating the value of different crosslisting effects -bonding, liquidity, capital cost, market segmentation, and so forth.
Separating these effects empirically is hard because firms opting into the US capital market "borrow" a bundle of things -not only "legal" ones (laws on the books, enforcement, regulators, judges, competent lawyers, and other legal professionals), but also "non-legal" ones (investors, consumers, analysts and other financial professionals, the ability to trade around the clock, and so forth). The fact that foreign firms listed on level-23 are traded at a higher premium than those listed on level-14 is consistent with the bonding hypothesis, but is also consistent with investor recognition hypothesis (if investors pay more attention to firms traded on national exchanges), analyst coverage hypothesis (if analyst coverage adds more value if a firm is traded on national exchange, or if trading on national exchange adds more analysts that are not picked up by existing databases), and so forth.
One way to avoid the joint hypothesis problem is to study the relative governance between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms (Leuz, 2006; Lel and Miller 2008), instead of looking at valuations. This view, however, requires us to rely on either (1) largely discredited country-level corporate governance indices (Spammann 2008 provides a discussion of systematic coding biases), or on (2) firm-level governance proxies, thereby overlooking a key source of bonding: rules supplied by the law and therefore unreflected in firm-level governance measures.
This paper suggests a different approach to separating the effects of bonding. I start with the observation that the US has at least five different legal regimes governing foreign companies. The first applies to firms raising capital in the US through a public offering ("Level-3" firms). Level-3 foreign firms are subject to the highest level of disclosure (or at least the level requiring the most up-to-date information). The are also subject to the highest litigation risk: Section 11 strict liability for a year from capital raising, followed by Section 10b scienter-based liability. The second group is "Level-2" firms, listed on national exchanges. Level-2 and Level-3 foreign firms are subject to substantively similar disclosure requirements, but Level-2 firms are allowed to delay reporting somewhat. Level-2 firms are subject only to the scienter-based Section 10b liability. The third group is foreign firms traded on Bulletin Board. These firms have gone through a recent regime change: Bulletin Board firms had no mandatory disclosure requirements prior to 1998, and became subject to the regular Level-2 disclosure obligations thereafter. Formally, foreign Bulletin Board firms have been subject to the same litigation regime in both periods, but in reality, the absence of mandatory disclosure significantly reduces the risk of litigation; as a result, the year of 1998 marks not only the increased disclosure exposure, but also the somewhat increased litigation exposure as well. The forth group is OTC-traded foreign firms. These firms are not subject to mandatory disclosure. Their litigation exposure is small but non-trivial: it is propelled by the existence of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys who usually have no difficulty finding a named plaintiff; their litigation risk is, however, lower than that of Level-2 firms because of the reluctance of US courts to assert jurisdiction over firms that have very little contact with anything located in the US and because of the practical difficulty of collecting damages. The fifth group is PORTAL-traded foreign firms. These are likewise not subject to mandatory disclosure; their litigation exposure is likely even smaller than that of OTC firms, since litigation in PORTAL cases is normally originated by institutions, rather than plaintiffs' attorneys.
The cornerstone of the US securities laws is disclosure. If most of the bonding value comes from the enhanced disclosure requirements, then, one can make the following predictions. First, level-3 companies should get the highest boost to their premia, followed by level-2 companies; level-1 and level-4 companies will get no benefit.
Second, this boost should have a permanent component that never disappears entirely even as other valuation-enhancing factors fluctuate. Third, the difference between level-2 and level-3 premia should be low in the first year after capital raising (due to somewhat more up-to-date disclosures of level-3 firms), and nonexistent thereafter. Finally, there should be no category of firms that enjoy no premia despite benefitting form the improved disclosure, or at least any such category would need an explanation.
If litigation exposure is the main source of bonding, one could make the following predictions. First, firms with higher volumes of US trading and higher volatility of stock price returns should get the highest boost to premia, regardless of their listing level. This is so because damages in securities class actions are calculated on the basis of trading volumes and stock price volatility. Second, if mandatory disclosure requirements provide an independent boost to litigation exposure, we should observe a positive relationship between premia, on one hand, and the US trading volume and return volatility, on the other hand, separately for each of the five groups of foreign companies. Third, if litigation exposure drives premia, level-3 firms should experience an increase in premia within the first year of capital raising, with a sharp decline at the expiration of that litigation period. This is so because the first year after capital raising provides the best opportunities for litigation by removing the requirement to show scienter.
In the long run and on aggregate across companies, if cross-listing premia are primarily caused by bonding, then, the fluctuations of premia over time should follow the fluctuations in comparative quality of laws and institutions affecting investor protection in the US and at a firm's home country. If nothing changes in US laws and the laws of a firm's home country, the premia should remain constant over time; if US laws remain constant, but foreign laws improve (as is commonly argued; see, for example, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007), the premia should decline.
I assemble a large panel of all firms cross-listed in the US between 1995 and 2006, on all levels of listing. I separate all cross-listed firms into two groups -USregulated (listed in the US on levels 2 or 3, or "level-23") and US-unregulated (listed in the US on levels 1 or 4, or "level-14"). 2 One well-known difficulty is that comparing cross-listed firms to the universe of all non-cross-listed firms might result in comparing apples and oranges: cross-listed firms might be vastly different, with different patterns across countries, in a way that cannot be captured through available financial and accounting variables. To reduce this problem, I compare cross-listed firms not with the universe of non-cross-listed firms, but with a sample of non-cross-listed firms that are similar to cross-listed firms. For each cross-listed firm, I select a match -a non-crosslisted public firm from the same country with the closest propensity to cross-list. The propensity to cross-list is based on industry, firm asset size, profitability, and leverage. I then compute "cross-listing premium" -the difference between the Tobin's Q of a crosslisted company and the Tobin's Q of its match.
I then look at changes in cross-listing premia over time, separately for level-23
and level-14 cross-listed firms, and ask whether these trends follow the pattern that one would expect based on the US disclosure rules and litigation regime. The answer is no. again dropping firms with missing data for more than two years in a row, and using country medians to fill in missing data for shorter periods. I estimate a logit model, separately for each country: produces similar results (not reported).
I also use the following firm-level control variables. All data is from Datastream.
All non-dummy firm-level and country-level control variables are normalized to mean = 0, σ = 1. I use these control variables for the cross-listed firm only, not for its matching firm.
I measure firm size as ln (sales) 
Tables
In Table 3 , I move to regression analysis and ask whether changes in NASDAQ In Table 4 , I show that the correlation with NASDAQ exists only during the cross-listing periods, and only for level-23 firms. This rejects the hypothesis that the firms whose premia correlated with US indices before listing happened to cross-list. I show this result using two different approaches. In Panel A, the dependent variable is monthly pair return (return of a cross-listed company minus return of its non-cross-listed match); independent variables are the same as in Table 3 . All regressions here use firm and month fixed effects and firm clusters. In Panel B, I use the Baruch-Karolyi-Lemmon measure of the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to the NASDAQ index. This variable takes one time-invariant value for each cross-listed company in the sample. Panel B uses country fixed effects and country clusters.
In Table 5 , I take a more nuanced look at the relationship between different US indices and the cross-listing premia. I find that the premia of NYSE-listed foreign firms are correlated with both NYSE and NASDAQ indices and the premia of the NASDAQlisted foreign firms are correlated only with the NASDAQ index. The premia of foreign firms traded on the OTC (non-BB) are not correlated with any US index. No group of foreign firms has premia correlated with the index of US-based OTC companies.
In Table 6 , I ask whether a firm's volume of US-based trading, as a fraction of its total trading volume, can predict the correlation of premia with US indices. The intuition is that a firm whose stock is barely traded in the US is less likely to be affected by the US market trends. This is in fact what I find. Among all foreign firms with high (above median) portion of US trading in their total trading volume, level-23 firms are more strongly correlated with the NASDAQ index than level-14 firms. However, there is no such gap among firms with below-median US trading.
In Table 7 In Table 8 , I investigate whether the premia of SEC-regulated foreign firms correlate with the NYSE/NASDAQ indices, but not with the OTC index, because the NYSE/NASDAQ firms are subject to the US regulation while the OTC firms are (almost)
not. I exploit a natural experiment here. Prior to 1999, US companies traded on OTCBB
were not subject to the SEC disclosure regulation; after 2001, they are. Thus, if the correlation between cross-listing premia and the indices is driven by the exposure of the index to the US laws, we should observe no correlation with the OTCBB index before 1999 and a positive correlation after 2001. I find no such change in correlations. As controls, I ask whether premia of level-23 firms correlated with the NASDAQ index during those same years; the answer is yes (columns 3 through 6). Table 9 presents one of the key findings of the paper. Because disclosure regulation is the backbone of the US securities law, it is particularly important to know whether the exposure to the US disclosure obligations affects premia of foreign firms.
The answer appears to be no. Level-2 and level-3 firms with below-median trading volumes have no cross-listing premia, even though they are subject to US disclosure requirements regardless of the volume of US-traded securities. This contradicts one of the main predictions of the bonding hypothesis -that the listing premium should always remain positive for level-2 or especially level-3 firms.
In Table 10 , I ask whether litigation-based bonding theory can explain the absence of premia in low-US-trading firms. The answer is no. US-based trading may impact bonding indirectly, through affecting expected damages from securities class actions, and therefore through affecting a firm's liability exposure. However, for litigation-based theory, it's the absolute volume of US trading that matters, not the relative portion of US trading volume in a firm's worldwide trading. I find that the absolute value of US trading does not itself predict Tobn's Q of cross-listed companies;
it's only the relative trading volume that does so. The latter is consistent with various liquidity-based explanations for cross-listing premia, but not with the litigation-bonding explanation. I also find no predictive power of US trading among level-14 firms, even though those firms are also exposed to US litigation, albeit to a lesser extent than level-23 firms. Finally, I find that another important factor driving litigation -volatility of firm's returns -does not predict firm value at all. Firm size, which is often thought of as positively affecting lawyers' litigation incentives, is a negative predictor here. The main result here is that Level-23 firms have a significant premia over level-14 firms, but only for the first six years after cross-listing; after that, the difference disappears. There is also no significant premia to Level-23 firms, as compared to Level- Table 12 , I break down the first ten years after cross-listing on three parts: 4 years + 3 years + 3 years. I find that during most litigious early years after entering the US markets, the US trading volume of foreign firms does not significantly predict premia; however, several years later, trading volume becomes a strong predictor and remains such through the end of the first decade. The results are similar if I divide cohorts differently (two years each, or one year, like in Table 11 ). This result is not consistent with bonding predictions.
Finally, in Table 13 , I use cohort analysis to test another version of the law-based bonding theory. Level-3 firms have higher disclosure requirements (or at least the requirement of being more up-do-date) than level-2 firms, but only during the time of capital raising and during a short time afterwards. In later years, the disclosure difference disappears. Likewise, level-3 firms are exposed to more litigation risk than level-2 firms, but only within a year of capital raising. Therefore, a law-based theory of bonding predicts that level-3 firms enjoy higher premia, as compared to level-2 firms, in years immediately following capital raising, but not many years later.
I test this prediction in Table 13 . Table 3 The table shows that pair premia of level-23 firms correlate with the NASDAQ index more strongly than premia of level-14 firms. The dependent variable is monthly fractional-change in cross-listing premium (Tobin's Q of a cross-listed company minus Tobin's Q of its non-crosslisted match). Dependent variables are: monthly fractional-change in the NASDAQ index; a dummy for trading on level 2 or 3; their interaction; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q; ln GDP per capita of firm's home country; Spammann's corporate governance index. The coefficient of interest is that on the interaction of the dummy-23 and NASDAQ. Regressions in columns (1) and (2) use firm and period (month) fixed effects and firm clusters; regression in column (3) uses firm random effects to preserve the coefficient on the time-invariant variable (Spammann corporate governance index). All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
(1) Panel B. The table shows that NASDAQ movements explain more variation in stock prices of level-23 firms than level-14 firms, but this is true only while the firm is cross-listed. Prior to cross-listing, firms that ultimately ended up listing on major US exchanges did not correlate more strongly with US markets than firms that later started trading on OTC or PORTAL. The dependent variable is the Baruch-Karolyi-Lemmon measure of the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to information in the US relative to information in the home market. In Columns (1) and (3), this sensitivity is measured during periods of cross-listing, and in Columns (2) and (4), before cross-listing. Independent variables are: dummies for trading on level 2 or 3, and separately on NYSE or NASDAQ; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q. The sample includes only crosslisted companies. The coefficients of interest are those on the dummy-23, dummy-NYSE, and dummy-NASDAQ. All regressions use country fixed effects and clusters. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest. Table 5 The table shows that (a) returns of level-23 cross-listed firms are correlated with the indices of the platforms on which those firms are traded, and sometimes with indices of similar platforms, but not with indices of dissimilar platforms; and (b) cross-listed OTC-traded firms (level 1) are not correlated with any of the US indices. The dependent variable is pair return (return of a crosslisted company minus return of its non-cross-listed match). Independent variables are: monthly returns on the three indices (NYSE, NASDAQ, and OTC); ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q. The coefficient of interest is that on the indices. All regressions use firm and month fixed effects and firm clusters. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest. Table 6 The table shows that only the firms with above-median ratio of US trading volume/ total trading volume have returns and premia correlated with US indices. Dependent variables are: in Columns (1) and (2), monthly fractional-change in pair Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q of a cross-listed company minus Tobin's Q of its non-cross-listed match); in Columns (3) and (4), monthly pair return (return of a cross-listed company minus return of its match). Independent variables are: dummy for level 2 or 3 listing; monthly return on the NASDAQ index; their interaction; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q. The coefficient of interest is that on the interaction variable. All regressions use firm and month fixed effects and firm clusters. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest. Table 7 Panel A. The table shows the factors predicting the correlation between NASDAQ movements and stock prices of cross-listed firms. The dependent variable is the Baruch-Karolyi-Lemmon measure of the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to information in the US relative to information in the home market, measured during the periods of cross-listing. Independent variables are: dummy for trading on level 2 or 3, a firm's worldwide trading volume; a firm's trading volume in the US; ratio of a firm's US trading volume to its worldwide trading volume; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q. The sample includes only cross-listed companies. All regressions use country fixed effects and clusters. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. Tstatistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
(1) Table 8 The table shows that the switch of Bulletin-Board firms from non-SEC-regulated to SECregulated status did not affect the correlation between the BB Index and the returns of foreign cross-listed firms. This suggests that US regulation does not drive the correlation between pair returns and indices. The dependent variable is monthly pair return (return of a cross-listed company and the return of its non-cross-listed match. Independent variables are: monthly returns on three US indices (Bulletin Board, NASDAQ, and NYSE); their interactions with the dummy for level 2 or 3 listing (dummy-23 drops out because of firm fixed effects); ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q. The coefficient of interest is that on the interaction between dummy-23 and the indices. In Columns (1), (3), and (5), the sample is limited to pre-BB-switch years (1994 through 1998) . In columns (2), (4), and (6), the sample is post-BB-switch years (2001 through Table 9 The table shows that cross-listing premia exist only for firms with above-median ratio of US trading volume/ total trading volume. Firms with below-median portion of US trading have no premia, regardless of level of US regulation. The dependent variable is pair Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q of a cross-listed company minus Tobin's Q of its non-cross-listed match). The sample is limited as follows: columns (1), (3), and (5) include only pairs with above-median ratio of US-to-total trading volume; columns (2), (4), and (6) include pairs with below-median ratio of US-to-total trading volume. In columns (1) through (4), "median" is for all pairs in the sample, including level-1 pairs. In columns (5) and (6), "median" is for the level-23 pairs in the sample (and is therefore higher, so above median sample is smaller). Dependent variables are: dummies for trading on level 2 or 3, or only on level-2 or on level-3; the NASDAQ index; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company; global industry Tobin's Q, and ln GDP of a company's home country. The coefficient of interest is that on the dummy-23, dummy-2, and dummy-3. All regressions use firm and month fixed effects and firm clusters. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest. Table 10 The Panel B. The table shows that returns of level-23 firms are significantly correlated with the NASDAQ index, and this correlation does not dissipate over time after cross-listing. The dependent variable is pair return (return of a cross-listed company minus return of its non-cross-listed match). The sample includes pairs listed on all levels. In each column, the sample is limited to the indicated months since cross-listing.
Independent variables are: monthly returns on the NASDAQ index; the ratio of a firm's US trading volume/ total trading volume; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth of the cross-listed company, global industry Tobin's Q. The coefficient of interest is that on the indices. All regressions use firm random effects, country and month fixed effects, and firm clusters. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest. Table 12 The table shows that the firm's ratio of US trading volume/ total trading volume predicts the firm's cross-listing premium. However, it does so in the way poorly consistent with the predictions of the bonding theory. In early years after cross-listing (most favorable to litigation), the correlation between US trading volume and premium is low; it increases sharply beginning 5 years after cross-listing. The dependent variable is the pair Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q of a cross-listed company minus Tobin's Q of its non-cross-listed match). The sample includes pairs listed on all levels. In column (1), the sample is limited to pairs where the cross-listed firm is listed between 0 and 4 years; in column (2), between 5 and 7 years; in column (3), between 8 and 10 years. The coefficient of interest is that on the interaction variable between dummy -23 and above-median level of US trading. Other dependent variables are: dummies for trading on level 2 or 3; dummy for above-median ratio of US trading volume/total volume; the NASDAQ index; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); global industry Tobin's Q. All regressions use firm random effects; country and month fixed effects; and firm clusters. Removing firm random effects does not significantly affect the results. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest. Table 13 The table shows that level-3 firms do not have higher premia than level-2 firms in years immediately following listing, contrary to the prediction of the disclosure-and litigation-based bonding theory. Level-3 firms have higher premia in later years, which is entirely explained by US trading volume. The dependent variable is the pair Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q of a cross-listed company minus Tobin's Q of its non-cross-listed match). The sample includes only pairs listed on levels 2 or 3. In Columns (1) and (3), the sample is limited to pairs where the crosslisted firm is listed between 0 and 5 years; in Columns (2) and (4), between 6 and 10 years. The coefficient of interest is that on the dummy for level-3 listing. Other dependent variables are: the NASDAQ index; ln of sales of the cross-listed company in a pair (a measure of size); sales growth; a firm's ratio of US to worldwide trading volume. All regressions use firm random effects; country and month fixed effects; and firm clusters. Removing firm random effects does not significantly affect the results. All non-dummy independent variables are normalized. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
Months
Listing Period 0 to 5 years 6 to 10 years 0 to 5 years 6 to 10 years (1) 
